About the service

A small service. One narrow purpose.

Whir is a privacy tool for one job: combining Bitcoin transactions with CoinJoin so the chain shows a joint movement of coins rather than a clear path from sender to receiver.

Why Whir exists

Bitcoin's privacy weakness is structural.

Every transaction is visible to anyone with a block explorer. Every wallet that touches an exchange becomes a candidate for being tied back to a real-world identity. Ordinary financial activity — private by default with cash, banks, or cards — becomes a permanent, searchable public record.

CoinJoin, introduced as a privacy technique in 2013, is one way to push back. Whir provides it without the wallet install, without the chain sync, without the marketing layer.

# Bitcoin's privacy property public_key → anonymous transaction → permanently visible wallet_history → attributable # What CoinJoin changes inputs_count → many outputs_count → many input_to_output → ambiguous # What Whir provides protocol → CoinJoin hosting → coordinator overhead → none

Operating principles

What this service runs on.

A short list of principles that show up across the site as concrete defaults.

Transparent pricing

Flat 1% + 0.0001 BTC. Same for every transaction regardless of amount, delay, or output configuration. Auditable with a calculator.

No accounts, no KYC

No email, no password, no identity document, no phone number. The only input is a Bitcoin receiving address.

Minimal logging

Records removed within 24 hours of completion. IP addresses not logged. No third-party tracking scripts on any page.

Honest about limits

Mixing is not a privacy panacea. A clear list of things it doesn't protect against is published, not hidden.

Reachable over Tor

Dedicated .onion hidden service for network-level privacy on top of on-chain mixing.

Fast by default

Instant mixes complete within 10–20 minutes — under five minutes of active interaction. Delays available when stronger anonymity is preferred.

What to expect

The trade-off, explicit.

Whir is built for users who want a hosted CoinJoin coordinator and accept the trade-off that comes with it. Worth being clear about.

Full threat model
  • Brief counterparty exposure. Coins pass through the operator's infrastructure during the mixing window. Users for whom this is unacceptable should use wallet-based CoinJoin (Wasabi, JoinMarket).
  • The protocol's limits are real. A careless user can still be re-identified after the mix. Mixing supplies the raw material for sensible operational privacy; the user supplies the rest.
  • Regulatory uncertainty. Legality of mixing varies by jurisdiction and has shifted since 2022. Users are responsible for the legal status of mixing where they live.

On the name

"Whir" appears in several Bitcoin privacy contexts.

Including the now-defunct Samourai Whirlpool and various unrelated services. This site is operationally independent of those projects. It implements the CoinJoin protocol described in the original 2013 proposal, in the form most suited to a hosted coordinator.

One job, done well

Try it on a small amount first.

Trust in a privacy service is built by small test mixes and consistent behaviour, not by claims on an About page.